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An Appealing Split
FILING AN APPEAL AFTER A PLEA BARGAIN:
IS COUNSEL OBLIGED TO FILE A MERITLESS APPEAL?1
INTRODUCTION
Plea bargains dominate our criminal justice system.2
Approximately 90% of criminal defendants accept plea bargains,
waiving their right to trial.3 Two-thirds of these plea bargains also
include a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal.4 However, does a
defendant’s waiver of appeal in a plea bargain relieve counsel of the duty
to file a notice of appeal upon a defendant’s request?
A criminal defendant’s right to “represent[ation] by counsel is a
fundamental component of [the United States] justice system.”5 In fact, a
defendant is not only guaranteed representation, but must also receive
reasonably effective assistance of counsel.6 Still, although the
Constitution promises the right to the effective assistance of counsel,
there is no constitutional right to an appeal.7 Nevertheless, a criminal
defendant has a statutory right to appeal.8 While a plea bargain may

1

This Note is an updated version of an article previously published in the New York
State Bar Association’s 2008 Law Student Legal Ethics Award Compendium. See Tamar KaplanMarans, Filing An Appeal After a Plea Bargain, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS’N 2008 LAW STUDENT
LEGAL ETHICS AWARD COMPENDIUM, Oct. 2008, at 27. Although a student Note was recently
published on the same topic, the original version of this Note was published first in the
Compendium. See Gregory P. Lavoy, Note, Neither a “Moose” Nor a “Puppet”: Defining a
Lawyer’s Role When Directed To Pursue An Appeal Notwithstanding a Valid Waiver of Appellate
Rights, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 265 (2008).
2
See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH (2003); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2004, at
62 (2006), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5172004.pdf; Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2497 (2004).
3
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS OF GUILTY, at xi (1999); G.
NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 1 (1997); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Review, Uncertain
Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2005).
4
Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 212 (2005).
5
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense.”). In criminal cases, lawyers “are necessities, not luxuries,” guaranteed by the
Constitution. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
6
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
7
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
8
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2006).
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provide for a waiver of defendant’s statutory right to appeal,9 it does not
waive a defendant’s constitutional right to effective counsel.10 Thus, after
agreeing to a waiver of appeal, if a defendant asks his or her attorney to
file an appeal, must counsel do so in order to meet the required standard
of effective counsel dictated by the Sixth Amendment?
In Nunez v. United States, the Seventh Circuit broke with seven
other circuit courts, holding that a plea bargain in which a defendant
waives the right to appeal relieves counsel of a duty to file an appeal.11
However, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits require counsel to file an appeal upon the defendant’s request
even after the defendant has waived his or her right through a plea
bargain.12 These circuits hold that counsel’s failure to file an appeal is
automatically considered ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore
entitling a defendant to an appeal.13 Even though a defendant’s waiver

9

See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990) (“It is clear that a
defendant may waive in a valid plea agreement the right of appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.”); United
States v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433, 1437 (4th Cir. 1989) (“If defendants can waive fundamental
constitutional rights such as the right to counsel or the right to a jury trial, surely they are not
precluded from waiving procedural rights granted by statute.”) (citation omitted).
10
Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 2006).
11
See Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S. Ct.
2990 (2008); see also Nunez v. United States (Nunez II), 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008); Nunez v. United
States (Nunez III), 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2008); Pamela A. MacLean, 7th Circuit Breaks With Six
Other Circuits Over Waiver of Appeal, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1187254928176.
The procedural history behind the Nunez cases is quite extensive. After the Seventh
Circuit decided Nunez I, the defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at *1, Nunez II, 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008) (No. 07-818), 2007 WL 4466866. Although
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it then remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit. Nunez II, 128
S. Ct. at 2990. Upon remand, the Seventh Circuit decided Nunez III. Nunez III, 546 F.3d at 450; see
also infra note 48. However, even though Nunez III is the Seventh Circuit’s more recent decision, this
Note mainly cites to Nunez I because the language in Nunez I and Nunez III is exactly the same,
almost word for word (except for a new introduction provided by the court in Nunez III). As noted by
the Seventh Circuit in Nunez III: “Instead of sending readers to our first opinion, we will repeat much
of what was said there. Recapitulation is better than leaving our reasoning scattered across volumes of
the Federal Reporter.” Nunez III, 546 F.3d at 453. In other words, even though there are two Seventh
Circuit opinions relevant to this Note, they are one and the same. As such, the above-the-line text of
this Note simply refers to them as “Nunez,” treating them as one case. However, the two cases are
differentiated in the footnotes here as Nunez I and Nunez III. Nunez II refers to the Supreme Court
decision to remand to the Seventh Circuit.
12
See Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir.
2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States,
433 F.3d 788, 793 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (9th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005). But see United States v.
Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 240-41 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that “the Seventh Circuit adopted the correct
approach in Nunez”), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3366 (2008).
13
See Watson, 493 F.3d at 964; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 268; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266;
Campusano, 442 F.3d at 771-72; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 790; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197-98;
Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1263.
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renders an appeal futile and therefore frivolous,14 counsel is still
required to file one under the Sixth Amendment.15
An analysis of the Supreme Court’s general jurisprudence on a
lawyer’s responsibility to file an appeal reveals that the Court has not
adopted a consistent approach or a bright line, per se rule stating when a
lawyer must file an appeal.16 In fact, the inconsistency of the Court’s
approach over the last forty years is evidenced by the circuit split at
hand. Highlighting the Court’s inconsistency, both the majority circuits17
and the Seventh Circuit engage in completely different, yet equally valid
analyses of the Court’s previous decisions in this area.
This lack of clarity has major practical implications for the
criminal defense system. Given the high volume of plea bargains
containing appeal waiver provisions,18 it is imperative that criminal
defense lawyers have clear guidance on how to proceed when a
defendant requests an appeal despite a waiver of the right to appeal. But
this very practical issue derives from the more theoretical question of
what a lawyer’s role should be within the lawyer-client relationship. The
contrary holdings of the circuits are a result of contrasting models of the
allocation of power in a client-lawyer relationship. The majority circuits
adopt a paradigm in which the client dominates the lawyer-client
relationship, whereas the Seventh Circuit follows a model in which the
lawyer maintains autonomy over the client. The Court has been
inconsistent on which model is correct, vacillating between a lawyerdominated relationship and a client-controlled one. Further complicating
this issue, the various codes of legal ethics are also inconsistent on the
relationship between a lawyer and client, with some ethical rules
favoring client autonomy and others encouraging a more paternalistic
approach toward clients. Given this lack of clarity in Supreme Court
jurisprudence as well as the ethics codes, a policy analysis is imperative
in determining whether the view of the majority circuits or the view of
the Seventh Circuit should prevail.
This Note explores the split among the circuit courts on this
issue of a lawyer’s responsibility to file an appeal once a defendant has
waived the right to appeal. It addresses the legal and theoretical analyses
behind the differing views as well as the policy implications. Part I
discusses the facts and history behind the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Nunez. Part II argues that both the Seventh Circuit and the majority
14

Such an appeal would be futile because an appellate court will dismiss the appeal
based solely on the fact that the defendant waived the right to appeal in the plea bargain.
15
See Watson, 493 F.3d at 964; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 268; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266;
Campusano, 442 at F.3d at 771-72; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 790; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at
1197-98; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1263.
16
See infra Part II.A for a more extensive analysis of this issue.
17
Throughout this Note, I will use the term “majority circuits” to refer to the Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, specifically their holdings in Watson,
Campusano, Poindexter, Tapp, Sandoval-Lopez, Garrett, and Gomez- Diaz.
18
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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circuits’ approaches can be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent.
Part III contends that the contrary holdings of the circuits is a result of
their adoption of contrasting models of the allocation of power in a
client-lawyer relationship and demonstrates the impact of the ethical
rules of the legal profession on the circuits’ decisions. Finally, Part IV
advocates for a policy-based analysis. Specifically, this Part argues that
the Seventh Circuit’s approach is preferable for our criminal justice
system because it benefits lawyers, defendants, the judiciary, and society
at large.
I.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN NUNEZ V. UNITED
STATES

In 2002, Armando Nunez was indicted and charged with
“multiple cocaine offenses.”19 The government possessed substantial
evidence that Nunez dealt cocaine to an undercover law enforcement
official and transported drugs in his automobile from the Chicago area to
distribution locations in Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey.20 As often
occurs in criminal cases, Nunez was assigned counsel who conducted an
investigation of the government’s case against Nunez.21 Once Nunez’s
counsel22 assessed that the government’s evidence against his client was
extremely strong and that Nunez was unlikely to prevail at trial, he
encouraged Nunez to accept the government’s offer of a plea bargain.23
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecutor dismissed two of
the three drug charges against Nunez and recommended a reduced
sentence.24 Nunez pled guilty to conspiring to knowingly and
intentionally possess cocaine with intention to distribute.25 Nunez agreed
to waive his right to direct appeal or collateral attack26 unless the
sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or the waiver was otherwise
invalid.27 Before accepting Nunez’s guilty plea, the district court
19

Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S.
Ct. 2990 (2008); see also Brief & Appendix of the United States at 3, Nunez v. United States, 495
F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-1014) .
20
United States v. Nunez, No. 04 C 3385, 2005 WL 2675043, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18,
2005), aff’d, Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008).
21
Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 19, at 4.
22
On September 9, 2002, John M. Cutrone was appointed as Nunez’s counsel. Id. at 3.
“On February 27, 2003, [Nunez] filed a motion for leave to substitute Robert L. Rascia as his
counsel,” which was granted by the district court. Id. at 12 n.3.
23
Id. at 4.
24
Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 548.
25
Nunez, 2005 WL 2675043, at *1.
26
A direct appeal is “[a]n appeal from a trial court’s decision directly to the
jurisdiction’s highest court, thus bypassing review by an intermediate appellate court.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 106 (8th ed. 2004). A collateral attack is “[a]n attack on a judgment in a
proceeding other than a direct appeal,” such as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (as Nunez later
filed). Id. at 278.
27
Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 545. Providing such an exception in an appeal waiver is quite
common. See King & O’Neill, supra note 4, at 213 (“Many defendants who waived their rights to
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painstakingly questioned Nunez28 to confirm that he “was knowingly and
voluntarily entering into the Plea Agreement”29 that would so drastically
waive many of his rights.30 The district court asked Nunez extensive
questions, and his answers indicated that he understood the exchange,
notably, that he was waiving his right to an appeal.31
Despite Nunez’s agreement to waive his right to appeal, he
nevertheless requested that his lawyer appeal the case.32 Nunez’s lawyer
refused to do so, given Nunez’s waiver of his right to appeal.33 In
response, Nunez filed a collateral attack,34 charging counsel with

review obtained clauses in their agreements that limited their exposure to unexpected negative
results at sentencing.”).
28
This questioning is required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(b). Rule
11 was amended in 1999 to specifically require courts to explain to defendants those plea bargains
that waive the right to appeal or collateral attack. See King & O’Neill, supra note 4, at 222, 224.
29
Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 19, at 6.
30
The following dialogue between Nunez and the Court indicates that the district court
clearly and explicitly indicated to Nunez the consequences of accepting the plea bargain:
District Court: Do you understand that, if you plead not guilty and you went to trial and
were found guilty, you would have a right to appeal every aspect of your case, including
any errors that occurred during the course of the trial? Do you understand that?
Petitioner: Yes.
...
District Court: Do you understand that [by pleading not guilty] you would have a right to
appeal the sentence you ultimately receive?
Petitioner: Yes.
District Court: Do you understand that in this plea agreement you are giving up your
right to appeal, direct appeal, of any aspects of your case, including the validity of your
plea and the sentence you ultimately receive? Do you understand that, sir?
Petitioner: Yes.
District Court: Do you understand, the only review rights you retain would be what is
called a collateral attack, which would allow you to raise a claim of involuntariness or
ineffective assistance of counsel? Do you understand that, sir? And that is only related to
this waiver in the plea agreement? Do you understand that, sir?
Petitioner: Yes.
Id. at 19-20 (alteration in original). This type of questioning is routine as required by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. See supra note 28.
31
Additionally, according to Cutrone (Nunez’s counsel), counsel reviewed the written
plea agreement with Nunez, explaining why Nunez should accept the plea. Brief & Appendix of the
United States, supra note 19, at 4-5. “According to Cutrone, he would never allow a client to enter
into a plea agreement unless [he] was certain a client understood . . . all the terms of the plea
agreement.” Id. at 5 n.2.
32
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook noted that it was unclear whether Nunez did
in fact ask his lawyer to file an appeal. Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 545. Still, for purposes of the opinion,
the Court assumed that Nunez did make this request. Id. at 545. This Note will work from the same
assumption.
33
Id.
34
Nunez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a type of
collateral attack. Id.; see also supra note 26.
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providing ineffective assistance.35 The collateral attack was denied by
both the district court36 and the Seventh Circuit.37 Because Nunez entered
into the plea voluntarily, the Seventh Circuit held that the plea was valid
and that the waiver must therefore be enforced.38 Since the waiver only
allowed for two exceptions for appeal (i.e., an illegally high sentence39 or
an invalid waiver40), Nunez’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
fell within the provisions of the waiver and was therefore excluded as a
35

In his habeas corpus petition, Nunez claimed that he did not enter knowingly and
voluntarily into the plea bargain and that his counsel failed to file an appeal upon his request. Nunez
stressed that he did not speak English “and that, because during some consultations with his counsel
an interpreter was not present . . . , he could not understand what counsel told him and therefore did
not understand the plea bargain’s terms.” Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 546. The Court made short shrift of
Nunez’s claims of incomprehension, noting that the record clearly indicated that Nunez repeatedly
told the district judge that he understood the consequences of entering into a plea. Therefore, the
Court concluded, the plea was voluntary. The Court proceeded to analyze the facts based on this
assumption that the waiver was in fact valid. Id. Of course, the holding of Nunez would not apply if
the waiver was not valid. An invalid waiver would change the legal analysis drastically; a basic
assumption and fact in Nunez as well as in the cases in the majority circuits discussed below is that
the plea was voluntary and that therefore the waiver of appeal was valid. See infra note 40.
36
United States v. Nunez, No. 04 C 3385, 2005 WL 2675043, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18,
2005), aff’d, Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008).
37
Nunez, 495 F.3d at 546, 548-49.
38
Id. at 545-46; see also infra note 40.
39
An illegally high sentence is one that exceeds the maximum punishment provided for
in the statute. Nunez’s sentence of 160 months was less than the statutory maximum provided for in
21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 545.
40
An invalid waiver can arise when a defendant does not voluntarily assent to it. For
example, if the defendant does not understand the terms of the waiver because he or she does not
speak English, a waiver can later be deemed invalid. However, as stated above, the district court
questioned Nunez to determine that he was voluntarily pleading guilty and waiving his rights. Nunez
told the judge that he understood English:
District Court: Now, are you pleading guilty today of your own free and voluntary act?
Petitioner: Yes.
...
District Court: Was this plea agreement read to you before you signed it?
Petitioner: Yes.
District Court: Was it read to you in Spanish?
Petitioner: No.
[Nunez’s Attorney]: We went over it in English, Judge. I constantly asked him if he
understood.
District Court: Are you convinced you understand the provisions of this plea agreement?
Petitioner: Yes.
District Court: You are satisfied with it having gone over it with your lawyer in English,
is that right?
Petitioner: Yes.
Brief & Appendix of the United States, supra note 19, at 7-8. Nunez’s attorney informed the district
court that Nunez “often spoke in English and understood their exchanges when interpreters were not
present.” Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 546. As the Seventh Circuit determined, Nunez accepted the waiver
voluntarily, and it was therefore valid. Id.
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potential claim.41 In sum, once Nunez agreed to waive his right to appeal,
Nunez’s counsel was not obliged to file an appeal, despite Nunez’s
wishes.42 Breaking with seven other circuits, the Seventh Circuit held that
the failure to file an appeal did not trigger an automatic ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because Nunez validly waived his right to
appeal.43
II.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT

In all of the cases addressed in the majority circuits, the facts
were almost indistinguishable from Nunez.44 Each defendant was charged
with a drug crime and accepted a plea bargain because the government
had significant evidence against him. As in Nunez, the defendants’ plea
bargains contained a waiver of the right to appeal unless the sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum or the waiver was invalid.45 Despite the
waiver, each defendant alleged that he asked his lawyer to appeal, and
counsel failed to do so.46 Yet, as opposed to the Seventh Circuit, the
majority circuits held that even where a defendant waived the right to
appeal, counsel was still required to file an appeal upon the defendant’s
request.47
How did the Seventh Circuit arrive at a conclusion so starkly
different from the other circuits?48 In order to address this striking
41

Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 546.
If Nunez had asked his lawyer to file an appeal based on the claim that the plea
bargain and waiver were involuntary, his lawyer would have been required to file the appeal. Id. at
547 (“A defendant who wants a lawyer to argue on appeal that the plea was involuntary has a right
to that legal assistance.”). Here, however, Nunez “never argued that the waiver [was] invalid” but
“[n]onetheless, he told his lawyer to appeal.” Id. at 545. Thus, according to the Seventh Circuit, a
lawyer cannot determine independently whether a defendant voluntarily waived the right to appeal
and then refuse to file the appeal. Rather, once the defendant acknowledges that the waiver was
voluntary, the lawyer has no duty to file the appeal. Id. at 547.
43
Id. at 548-49.
44
See Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 264 (5th Cir.
2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States,
433 F.3d 788, 790 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1194-95 (9th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2005).
45
Each defendant was extensively questioned by the judge to ensure that there was an
understanding of the terms of the plea agreement. See, e.g., Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 266; SandovalLopez, 409 F.3d at 1194; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1263-64.
46
See Watson, 493 F.3d at 962; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 267 n.4; Campusano, 442 F.3d
at 772; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 791; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1195; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1264;
see also infra note 190 and accompanying text. In all of the cases in the majority circuits (except for
United States v. Tapp in the Fifth Circuit) as well as in Nunez, it was unclear whether the defendant
actually requested that counsel file an appeal. However, the circuits proceed on the assumption that
an appeal was in fact requested by the defendant. In United States v. Tapp, however, the lawyer
actually filed the appeal but it was dismissed as untimely. Tapp, 491 F.3d at 264.
47
Watson, 493 F.3d at 964; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 268; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266;
Campusano, 442 at F.3d at 771-72; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 790; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at
1197-98; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1263.
48
It is important to note that in Nunez I, the Seventh Circuit denied that it was creating a
circuit split by explicitly stating that it was not adopting a holding contrary to the other circuits. See
42
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posture taken by the Seventh Circuit, it is crucial to look to the Supreme
Court cases that influence both the Seventh Circuit and the majority
circuits, most notably Anders v. California,49 Strickland v. Washington,50
and Roe v. Flores-Ortega.51 Although the circuit courts each applied the
same Supreme Court cases on a lawyer’s responsibility to file an appeal,
the conclusion reached by the majority circuits in applying Court
precedent was distinctly opposite to the Seventh Circuit’s application.
Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence surprisingly supports both the Seventh
Circuit and the majority circuits’ approach. This anomaly is a result of
Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2007) (“But we need not decide
whether these arguments are a sufficient response to the mandatory-appeal-notwithstanding-thewaiver-of-appeal approach that our colleagues in other circuits derived . . . .”); see also CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 594.1 n.14 (3d ed. Supp. 2007)
(“Citing the six circuits which have held that it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel for a
defense attorney to fail to file a requested notice of appeal where defendant had waived right to file
direct appeal and collateral challenge in plea agreement, the Seventh Circuit . . . does not decide the
question.”) (emphasis added). Instead, the Seventh Circuit proposed an alternate holding at the end
of its opinion that attempted to distinguish the Nunez I facts from the cases before the majority
circuits. Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 548. As described above, Nunez I consisted of a collateral attack based
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 545; see also supra Part I.A. The court noted that
Nunez’s waiver contained not only a waiver of the right to direct appeal but also a waiver barring
relief on collateral review. Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 548-49. Because of the collateral review waiver, the
court opined that Nunez had effectively waived his right to make an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in a collateral attack. Id. Consequently, the main issue of whether counsel’s failure to file a
notice of appeal would entitle Nunez to a new appeal was a moot question because relief was barred
regardless by the plea bargain’s waiver of collateral review. Id. (“Nunez’s waiver must be enforced
and his collateral attack dismissed whether or not his lawyer should have filed an appeal on
demand.”) (emphasis added). As such, even though the Nunez I decision was a strongly-worded,
five-page opinion adamantly advocating against the position of the other circuits for the majority of
its text, it nevertheless did not actually create a circuit split.
However, after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Nunez I, 495 F.3d 544, vacated, 128
S. Ct. 2990 (2008), Nunez petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, specifically requesting that
the Supreme Court resolve the “conflict among the circuits.” See Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 11, at *1. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but then vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit, ignoring the issue of a circuit split. Nunez v. United States
(Nunez II), 128 S. Ct. 2990, 2990 (2008). Rather, upon the urging of the Solicitor General, the Court
remanded the case in order to examine whether the Seventh Circuit misconstrued the scope of
Nunez’s waiver. Id. at 2990. More specifically, the purpose of the remand was to examine whether
the collateral review waiver precluded Nunez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 299091 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Upon remand though, the government confessed error and stated that Nunez’s waiver
did not preclude Nunez’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Nunez v. United States (Nunez
III), 546 F.3d 450, 451-52 (7th Cir. 2008). The government urged the Seventh Circuit to consider the
substantive issues of the collateral attack and to proceed on the merits. Id. at 452. Although the
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the government’s interpretation of the waiver, noting that the waiver
did in fact preclude Nunez’s collateral review, it nonetheless proceeded with a merits analysis of the
collateral attack. Id. Still, as originally stated in Nunez I, the court concluded in Nunez III that a
defendant who has waived the right to appeal via plea bargain is not entitled to a new appeal when
counsel fails to file the appeal upon the defendant’s request. Nunez III, 546 F.3d at 453-54. Nunez III
therefore solidified the dicta-created circuit split originally discussed in Nunez I.
49
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that a lawyer cannot decide independently that an
appeal would be frivolous).
50
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (holding that a two-prong test is necessary to determine a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
51
528 U.S. 470, 478-79 (2000) (holding that a criminal defendant has a statutory right to
appellate review, and that when counsel frustrates that right by failing to consult with the client
regarding an appeal, counsel’s performance is automatically ineffective).
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the Supreme Court’s failure to adopt a consistent approach and a brightline, per se rule stating when a lawyer must file an appeal.
A.

Supreme Court Cases on the Right to Effective Counsel and the
Right to Appeal

The first case of relevance is Anders v. California, which
occurred after an explosion of cases under the Warren Court concerning
the indigent’s right to counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment.52 In
Anders v. California, the Court held that a lawyer cannot make an
independent decision that a defendant’s appeal would be frivolous.53 If
counsel for a criminal defendant determines that a defendant’s claims are
frivolous after a careful examination, counsel must advise the court and
request permission to withdraw.54 The Court required, however, that
counsel submit a “brief referring to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal.”55 Following the submission of this brief
(now known as an Anders brief),56 the court (and not counsel) then
decides whether the case is frivolous.57 Counsel must therefore continue
as the defendant’s advocate until the court agrees with counsel’s
suggestion that further litigation would be frivolous.58
In Anders, the Court rejected the lawyer’s power to dismiss an
appeal as frivolous, thereby rejecting the lawyer’s ability to assert his or
her professional judgment concerning the nature of the litigation.59 As the
dissent noted, the Anders majority made the “cynical assumption that an
appointed lawyer’s professional representation to an appellate court . . .
is not to be trusted” and that a lawyer could not properly or honestly
determine the merits of an appeal.60 Thus, in Anders, the Court adopted a
mechanical rule requiring a lawyer to file an appeal (or at the very
minimum, an Anders brief), regardless of his or her professional
judgment as to the worthiness of the appeal.61
Despite the bright-line rule established in Anders, the Court took
a different approach in Strickland v. Washington and rejected a
52

See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
53
Anders, 386 U.S. at 738.
54
Id. at 744.
55
Id.
56
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “Anders brief” as “a brief
filed by a court-appointed defense attorney who wants to withdraw from the case on appeal based on
a belief that the appeal is frivolous”).
57
Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 776 (2d Cir. 2006).
58
Anders, 386 U.S. at 744-45.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority makes the incorrect
assumption that “lawyers appointed to represent indigents are so likely to be lacking in diligence,
competence or professional honesty”).
61
Id. at 744-45 (majority opinion).
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mechanical rule for determining ineffective counsel claims.62 Under the
Strickland standard, in order to show that counsel was ineffective, a
defendant must demonstrate first that “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and second, that “there
is . . . reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”63 The Court
explicitly noted that they were rejecting the establishment of mechanical
rules and that the ultimate inquiry would be one of “fundamental
fairness” and “reasonableness” as opposed to a more concrete standard.64
Because there is no exacting set of comprehensive rules that can take into
account the wide variety of circumstances that a criminal defense lawyer
might face, the Court held that there was no reason to create rules that
would limit the independence of counsel.65
Following in the vein of Strickland, Roe v. Flores-Ortega also
rejected a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with the
defendant regarding an appeal.66 In Flores-Ortega, counsel failed to file a
notice of appeal without the defendant’s consent.67 Instead of adopting a
per se standard, the Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, counsel
has a duty to consult with the defendant regarding an appeal when
counsel has sufficient reason to believe that a rational defendant would
want to appeal or when a defendant demonstrates to counsel an interest
in appealing.68 As in Strickland, the Court adopted a two-prong approach:
first, assessing whether counsel’s failure to file an appeal was deficient,
and second, examining whether the deficient performance prejudiced a
defendant’s case. The Court stressed that courts must look to the “totality
of circumstances,” “tak[ing] into account all the information counsel
knew or should have known.”69 Hence, in the context of an appeal, a
defendant must show that there is reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s deficient failure to consult with the defendant about an appeal,
the defendant would have appealed.70 Prejudice will be presumed when
the “defendant [was] denied the opportunity for a proceeding at all.”71

62

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
Id .at 687-88, 703.
64
Id at 697.
65
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 (“No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s
conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set
of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.”).
66
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000). The Court specifically stated, “[W]e
refuse to make this determination as a per se . . . matter.” Id. at 481 (emphasis omitted).
67
Id. at 474-75.
68
Id. at 479.
69
Id. at 480.
70
A defendant would not have to show that he or she would have prevailed on appeal but
merely that he or she would appealed had the lawyer presented it as an option.
71
Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 792 (2005).
63
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Like Strickland, the Flores-Ortega court embraced a fuzzy standard, one
that would not provide exacting guidance to lawyers and judges.
Despite the Court’s explicit and clear rejection of a per se rule
that counsel must always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal,
the Court made a variety of ambiguous statements in Flores-Ortega. At
first, the Court stated the definite rule that “a lawyer who disregards
specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a
manner that is professionally unreasonable.”72 However, immediately
following this bright-line rule, the Court expressly rejected the
imposition of mechanical rules on counsel.73 Specifically, the Court
stated that while states can impose specific rules on attorneys to protect
defendants’ rights, the federal Constitution only requires that counsel
make “objectively reasonable choices,” whatever that may entail (i.e.,
there is no specific definition or rule defining “reasonable choice”).74
Additionally, the Court emphasized that the American Bar Association’s
(“ABA”) Standards for Criminal Justice are merely guidelines and not
rules.75 Thus, despite the Court’s original statement that a lawyer may not
disregard specific instructions to appeal (ostensibly a categorical rule,
reminiscent of Anders), the Court proceeded to reject any form of
mechanical rules to be imposed on lawyers.76
In summary, as is evident in the trajectory from Anders to
Strickland through Flores-Ortega, the Court adopted a mechanical rule
in Anders, rejected a per se rule in Strickland, and then wavered in
Flores-Ortega between a concrete rule and a more amorphous standard.
The Court’s wavering left a question hanging in the air: should
mechanical rules be imposed on lawyers in an effort to protect criminal
defendants’ right to effective counsel? If yes, then the majority circuits’
mechanical view should prevail, requiring a lawyer to file an appeal
regardless of the defendant’s waiver of appeal. Or should lawyers have
the power to exercise their professional discretion at every twist and turn
in the road? If yes, then the Seventh Circuit’s approach would be correct,
granting counsel the power to determine whether an appeal should be
filed once a defendant has waived the right. As analyzed below, the

72

Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477. If counsel does not “file a requested appeal, a
defendant is entitled to [a new] appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have had merit.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 28 (1999)) (internal
quotations omitted).
73
Id. at 478. The Court found that such rules are “not appropriate.” Id. at 479 (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
74
Id. at 479.
75
Id.; see generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993).
76
Similarly, in Jones v. Barnes, the Court rejected a per se ruling that counsel has to
raise every non-frivolous argument. While a criminal defendant maintains a right to make certain
fundamental choices regarding his or her case, he or she does not have a constitutional right to
compel counsel to make every possible argument. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S 745, 751 (1983).
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Supreme Court’s inconsistent view of a lawyer’s role is the root of the
conflict within the circuits.
B.

The Application of Supreme Court Precedent to Nunez v. United
States

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Nunez does not conflict with
the earlier holdings of the Supreme Court in Anders, Flores-Ortega, and
Strickland. As discussed below, Nunez can be reconciled with the
holdings of the Supreme Court in Anders and Flores-Ortega. At the same
time, Nunez implicitly follows the precedent set forth in Strickland.77
Examining Anders, it can be argued that the Anders rule—that “a
lawyer cannot make an independent decision about whether an appeal
would be frivolous”—only applies when a defendant actually maintains a
right to appeal.78 Nunez did maintain a right to appeal if the sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum or the waiver was invalid.79 However,
he waived his right to appeal based on post-sentence ineffective
assistance of counsel when he accepted the plea bargain.80 The Anders
approach therefore is not applicable here since in this instance Nunez
waived his right to appeal based on ineffective counsel.
Similarly, Flores-Ortega is also inapplicable in Nunez. In
Flores-Ortega, the Court stated that filing an appeal is a purely
“ministerial task” as opposed to a strategic one, and therefore counsel
was required to file the appeal.81 Quite the contrary, the decision to file
an appeal in Nunez qualified as a strategic decision as opposed to
“ministerial.” Whereas an appeal can only help but not harm most
defendants, Nunez faced the risk of harm if an appeal was filed.
Specifically, because Nunez waived his right to appeal, the prosecutor
could withdraw concessions already granted upon counsel’s filing of an
appeal.82 Thus, given the fact that the appeal could not succeed, counsel’s
filing of the appeal could have harmed Nunez by resulting in the
prosecutor taking the generous concessions off of the table.83

77

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2990 (2008).
79
Id. at 545.
80
Id. at 548.
81
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000).
82
See Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 548; see also United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 128 (2d
Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen a defendant breaches his plea agreement, the Government has the option to . . .
treat it as unenforceable.”); United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have
held that a defendant who breaks a promise not to appeal entitles the prosecutor to walk away . . . .”);
United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir. 2001) (“If the defendant does not keep his
promises, the prosecutor is not bound either.”).
83
Nunez I, 495 F.3d at 548 (“A defendant has more reason to protest if a lawyer files an
appeal that jeopardizes the benefit of the bargain than to protest if the lawyer does nothing—for
‘nothing’ is at least harmless.”). In the plea bargain, the prosecutor conceded to the dismissal of two
78
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Moreover, Nunez falls outside of the scope of Flores-Ortega
because unlike the defendant in Flores-Ortega, the defendant in Nunez
waived his right to direct and collateral review.84 In his concurring
opinion to Flores-Ortega,85 Justice Souter expressly noted that the facts
of Flores-Ortega did not involve a defendant who waived his right to
appeal as part of a plea agreement (as opposed to Nunez, which did).86
Similarly, Justice Souter specifically recognized that there can be cases
that fall “beyond the margin” of Flores-Ortega, in which counsel would
not be required to consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.87 For
example, as he suggests, counsel would not have a duty to discuss an
appeal with the defendant if the judge meticulously explained the appeal
rights to the defendant during the plea colloquy.88 As described above,
the district court did in fact ask Nunez extensive questions, and his
answers indicated that he understood the exchange.89 Therefore, this
exception noted by Justice Souter to the holding of Flores-Ortega
certainly applies to Nunez.
Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Flores-Ortega also makes
evident the difference between Flores-Ortega and Nunez. The question
of Flores-Ortega, according to Justice Ginsburg, is merely whether
defense counsel can abandon the defendant without counseling him or
her regarding appeal rights.90 However, as Justice Ginsburg noted, the
issue in Flores-Ortega is limited to the counseling aspect (i.e., lawyer
must provide counsel or advice regarding an appeal) but does not rule on
whether counsel has a requirement to actually file the appeal. The facts in
Nunez extended beyond a mere consultation between a lawyer and client
and instead concerned the actual filing of an appeal.
Nonetheless, even if one argued that Nunez fell within the scope
of Flores-Ortega, it would not preclude the Seventh Circuit’s holding
because Nunez would not be able to meet the test set out in Floresof the three drug charges against Nunez and a recommendation for a reduced sentence. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
84
United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The Flores-Ortega Court
made clear that a presumption of prejudice applies in the context of an ineffectiveness claim because
an attorney’s deficient performance deprives the defendant of his or her opportunity for an appellate
proceeding. Notably, Flores-Ortega did not address whether this principle has any force, let alone
controls, where the defendant has waived his right to appellate and collateral review.”), petition for
cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3366 (2008).
85
Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg joined Part II-B of Flores-Ortega but dissented
from Part II-A. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 488 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
86
“[T]here is no claim here that [defendant] waived his right to appeal as part of his plea
agreement.” Id. at 488 n.1.
87
Id.
88
Justice Souter does, however, dismiss this situation as highly unlikely. Id. (“Such a
possibility is never very likely and exists only at the furthest reach of theory, given a defendant’s
right to adversarial representation.”). Still, it certainly appears as if the district judge in Nunez
meticulously explained the appeal rights to the defendant during the plea colloquy. See supra
note 30.
89
See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
90
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 493 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Ortega to determine ineffective counsel. As stated above, the first prong
of this test requires that the defendant demonstrate that counsel has
performed deficiently, taking into account all the information counsel
knew and determining whether “a rational defendant would [have]
want[ed] to appeal.”91 In Flores-Ortega, the Court specifically notes that
in assessing the deficiency prong, “a highly relevant factor . . . will be
whether the conviction follows a guilty plea . . . .”92 Since a plea bargain
limits the appealable issues, a plea signals to counsel that the defendant
is seeking an end to judicial proceedings.93 Therefore, counsel’s
performance might not be considered deficient in this circumstance
because the defendant indicated through his behavior that he did not
want to appeal the case. Consequently, counsel legitimately did not file
an appeal.94 Since Nunez’s conviction followed a guilty plea, his
behavior indicated to his attorney that he was seeking an end to judicial
proceedings. As such, his counsel’s performance was not deficient in
failing to file the appeal, and Nunez fails to meet the first prong of
Flores-Ortega, which requires deficient performance by counsel.95
Hence, the Flores-Ortega standard required to show ineffective counsel
is not satisfied in Nunez.96
Without explicitly stating so, the holding in Nunez implicitly
follows the general philosophy set forth by the Court in Strickland.
Nunez rejects the imposition of mechanistic rules upon lawyers, which
may limit the ability of counsel to make decisions based on professional
judgment, experience, and common sense.97 In particular, the holding of
Nunez does not restrict the wide latitude counsel maintains in making
strategic decisions for the client98 but rather, as required by Strickland,
implicitly applies a standard of reasonableness when addressing whether
an appeal should be filed by counsel.99 Following in the vein of
91

Id. at 480 (majority opinion).
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 479.
95
Id. at 480.
96
Similarly, Nunez fails to meet the second prong of Flores-Ortega, which requires the
defendant to demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance. Id. at 482. According to
Flores-Ortega, prejudice will be presumed when the defendant is denied the opportunity for a
proceeding at all. Id. at 483. Here, Nunez was in fact denied the opportunity for a proceeding by his
counsel’s failure to file an appeal. However, in Flores-Ortega, the Court specifically noted that in
order for prejudice to be presumed, the defendant must have a right to the judicial proceeding that he
or she did not receive as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Id. (“The even more serious
denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself, which a defendant wanted at the time and to which he
had a right, similarly demands a presumption of prejudice.”) (emphasis added). Quite the contrary
here, Nunez maintained no right to an appeal proceeding because he waived the right in the plea
bargain. Thus, the presumption of prejudice does not apply, and the second prong of the FloresOrtega standard required to show ineffective counsel is not satisfied in Nunez.
97
Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S.
Ct. 2990 (2008).
98
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
99
Id. at 687-88.
92
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Strickland, Nunez calls for a lawyer to focus on “the overriding mission
of vigorous advocacy of the defendant’s cause”100 and to reasonably
assess whether the filing of an appeal would be a wise and appropriate
decision. As stated above, the filing of an appeal could only have harmed
and not helped Nunez.101 Additionally, Nunez demonstrated that he was
seeking an end to judicial proceedings when he accepted the plea.
Therefore, Nunez’s counsel certainly acted with “reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms”102 in refusing to file an appeal as required
by Strickland.
C.

The Application of Supreme Court Precedent to the Majority
Circuits

For the most part, the majority circuits applied Anders and
Flores-Ortega in their analyses, the same Supreme Court cases used by
the Seventh Circuit.103 Unlike the Seventh Circuit, however, the majority
circuits prioritize the need to protect a defendant’s right to appeal, even
after he or she has seemingly waived this right.104
Even though Flores-Ortega did not involve a defendant waiving
his or her right to appeal, the majority circuits nonetheless apply FloresOrtega to cases involving such a waiver. According to the majority
circuits, Flores-Ortega stands for the unambiguous proposition that “it is
only when the defendant either does not make his appellate wishes
known or does not clearly express his wishes that an attorney has some
latitude in deciding whether to file an appeal.”105 They focus on the
“unequivocal”106 language in Flores-Ortega, which states “that a lawyer
who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of
appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.”107 In
essence, “Flores-Ortega reaffirms the time-honored principle that an
attorney is not at liberty to disregard the appellate wishes of his client”108
100

Id. at 689.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
102
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
103
The majority circuits also looked at other cases but these three cases were the most key
to their analysis as well as to the analysis in this Note. See infra note 110.
104
See, e.g., Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 2006).
105
United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Watson v.
United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 265-66 (5th
Cir. 2007); Campusano, 442 F.3d at 777; Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 793 (11th Cir.
2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2005).
106
Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 269.
107
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S 470, 477 (2000).
108
Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 269; see also Watson, 493 F.3d at 964; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 26566; Campusano, 442 F.3d at 777 (“The concern animating Flores-Ortega . . . is a powerful one even
where the defendant is the only person who believes an appeal would be worthwhile.”); GomezDiaz, 433 F.3d at 793; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1199 (“Nevertheless the client has the
constitutional right, under Flores-Ortega . . . to bet on the possibility of winning the appeal and then
winning an acquittal, just as a poker player has the right to hold the ten and queen of hearts, discard
101

1198

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

for any reason. If the defendant can show that he or she requested an
appeal and counsel failed to do so, prejudice will be presumed under the
Flores-Ortega standard, and the defendant will be entitled to an appeal
on an ineffective counsel claim.109 As required by Anders, a lawyer who
believes the requested appeal is frivolous should still file the appeal and
submit a brief to the court explaining the frivolous nature of the
defendant’s claim.110
While the majority circuits’ application of Flores-Ortega and
Anders may be legally sound and reasonable, it ignores the directive in
Strickland to avoid establishing “mechanical rules” in determining the
standard for effective counsel.111 Unlike the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in
Nunez, the majority circuits adopt a per se rule requiring a lawyer to file
an appeal even if counsel’s professional judgment indicates that such an
appeal would be frivolous or even harmful to the defendant.112 However,
while adopting a bright-line rule for lawyers does indeed go against the
general sentiment of Strickland, the majority circuits’ interpretation of
Flores-Ortega is legitimate. As described above, the Court in FloresOrtega made a variety of ambiguous statements, first stating a bright-line
rule113 but then expressly rejecting the imposition of mechanical rules on
counsel as “not appropriate.”114 Moreover, in Flores-Ortega, the Court
continued to endorse Anders, which certainly can be categorized as a per
se rule (given that it categorically prevents a lawyer from dismissing a
defendant’s appeal as frivolous).115 Thus, although the majority circuits
do not incorporate the Strickland philosophy, this omission is a reflection
of the lack of clarity and inconsistency in the relevant Supreme Court
jurisprudence rather than a dishonest application of the law.
III.

THE ALLOCATION OF POWER BETWEEN COUNSEL AND CLIENT

This circuit split is complicated by the fact that both the Seventh
Circuit and the majority circuits’ holdings can be reconciled with
three aces, and pray that when he draws three cards, he gets a royal flush.”); Garrett, 402 F.3d at
1266-67.
109
Campusano, 442 F.3d at 772.
110
The majority circuits also look to other cases for support such as Peguero v. United
States, 526 U.S. 23, 28 (1999) (“[W]hen counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a defendant is
entitled to resentencing and to an appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have had
merit.”) and Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 330 (1969) (“Those whose right to appeal has
been frustrated should be treated exactly like any other appellants; they should not be given an
additional hurdle to clear just because their rights were violated at some earlier stage in the
proceedings.”).
111
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984); see also supra note 65.
112
Watson, 493 F.3d at 964; Poindexter, 492 F.3d at 268; Tapp, 491 F.3d at 266;
Campusano, 442 at F.3d at 771-72; Gomez-Diaz, 433 F.3d at 790; Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at
1197-98; Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1263.
113
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477 (“[A] lawyer who disregards specific instructions from
the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.”).
114
Id. at 479 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).
115
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
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Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area.116 Notably, either viewpoint
can be explained as consistent with or as distinguishable from Anders
and Flores-Ortega.117 This suggests that there is more to the circuit split
than meets the eye, and what lies at the core of the courts’ disagreement
is much more than a varying interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.
The courts’ contrasting views reflect different philosophical approaches
towards decision-making in the lawyer-client relationship. While the
majority circuits embrace a model in which the client makes the
fundamental choices, the Seventh Circuit adopts one in which the lawyer
determines the tactical and strategic decisions. As discussed below, these
two models are also present in the various codes of legal ethics, which
fail to endorse one over the other. Consequently, similar to the Supreme
Court cases, looking to the ethical guidelines for guidance regarding this
circuit split provides yet another dead-end.
A.

The Two Models of Lawyering

There are two major approaches to lawyering: “the traditional,
lawyer-centered model and the participatory, client-centered
approach.”118 In the traditional model, the autonomous lawyer maintains
the discretion to assert his or her professional judgment over the
significant decisions.119 Under this model, by retaining counsel, the
defendant has accepted a passive role and implicitly agreed to allow
counsel to handle the case.120 Decision-making is delegated to the lawyer
in this paradigm because it is in the public’s best interest to entrust legal
issues to lawyers, the officers of our justice system.121 On the other hand,
116

See supra Part II.B-C.
Id.
118
Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between
Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking,
47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998); see also Mark J. Osiel, Review, Lawyers as Monopolists,
Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (1990) (“Two very different
conceptions of the lawyer compete for ascendancy within Western society. Each claims both to
describe the essential social role of the attorney and to prescribe the ethical standards entailed by it.
The first conception enshrines the moral ideal of public service and conceives of the bar
association—the expression of collective power—primarily as a necessary check against capitulation
by individual attorneys in the face of antisocial demands by clients. The second conception upholds
the ideal of loyalty to clients as the touchstone of professional ethics and conceives of bar
associations as vigorous advocates for the legitimate interests of lawyers in a pluralistic society of
freely competing interest groups.”).
119
See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 118, at 7.
120
See id.; see also David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L.
REV. 454, 457-59; Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client
Decision Making and the Role of Rules in Structuring the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1003, 1003 (1980) (“The traditional rule and practice has been to allocate decisionmaking authority around ends and means, with ‘ends’ being the client’s decision and ‘means’ the
lawyer’s.”).
121
See Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective Assistance and ClientCentered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 876 (1998). See generally Mark Spiegel, The Case of
Mrs. Jones Revisited: Paternalism and Autonomy in Lawyer-Client Counseling, 1997 BYU L. REV.
307 (1997) (arguing that a lawyer’s choice of the paternalistic model of lawyering versus the
117
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the client-centered model allows for a defendant to make active choices
while counsel merely lays out the legal arguments, providing guidance and
suggestions.122 Still, the defendant maintains the authority over decisionmaking.123 This model ensures that lawyers listen to their clients.
The Seventh Circuit explicitly rejects the client-centered model
in Nunez, contending that there is nothing in the Sixth Amendment that
requires a lawyer to function as “the client’s puppet.”124 Alternatively, the
Seventh Circuit opined that “[p]rotecting a client from a lay-person’s folly
is an important part of a lawyer’s job[,]”125 and a lawyer must therefore
exercise his or her own professional discretion to provide this protection to
the client. Furthermore, the court stated that it is a lawyer’s duty “to do
what’s best for the client,” and it is up to the lawyer to determine what this
may entail.126 Because Nunez instructed his counsel to file a potentially
detrimental appeal (i.e., it could have resulted in the prosecutor
withdrawing concessions), his lawyer was correct in exercising his
discretion and ignoring Nunez’s request to file an appeal.127
On the other hand, the majority circuits focus on protecting the
defendant’s rights within the lawyer-client relationship by granting the
client the full autonomy and power to make decisions.128 In this clientcentered model, the client maintains the option to decide on filing an
appeal because no corners should be cut when Sixth Amendment rights are
at issue.129 Even though it may harm a defendant if counsel files an appeal,
this dangerous and risky decision to appeal remains with the defendant:
autonomous client model ultimately affects the way one counsels a client in a significant way); Mark
Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U.
PA. L. REV. 41 (1979) (arguing same); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client
Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987) (arguing for an alternative
allocation of power in the attorney-client relationship modeled on an informed consent doctrine).
122
Paul R. Tremblay, Critical Legal Ethics, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 148 (2007)
(reviewing SUSAN D. CARLE, LAWYERS ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (2005)); see
also Uphoff & Wood, supra note 118, at 8-10.
123
See Zeidman, supra note 121, at 876; Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow:
The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L.
363, 395 (2003).
124
Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S.
Ct. 2990 (2008).
125
Id. at 548.
126
Id.
127
Interestingly, Judge Easterbrook’s holding in Nunez is consistent with his general
economic analyses of the criminal justice system. For an interesting discussion on Judge
Easterbrook’s view of a criminal justice system in which defendants are subject to the uncontrolled
discretion of individual public officials, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a
Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 43 (1988). In his general jurisprudence, Judge
Easterbrook supports discretion in the criminal justice system as efficient, taking the power of
decision away from the defendant. He argues that “discretionary arrangements designed to pursue
efficiency do not have unfair effects.” Id. at 44.
128
See Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 265-66 (5th Cir.
2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States,
433 F.3d 788, 793 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir.
2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2005).
129
Campusano, 442 F.3d at 777.
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Sometimes demanding that one’s lawyer appeal is like demanding that one’s
doctor perform surgery, when the surgery is risky and has an extremely low
likelihood of improving the patient’s condition. But even though no one would
think a doctor incompetent for refusing to perform unwise and dangerous
surgery, the law is that “a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the
defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally
unreasonable.”130

In adopting the per se rule that the lawyer must file the appeal at a
defendant’s request, the majority circuits are in effect stating: “We will let a
defendant walk off a cliff but at least it will be his or her decision to do so.”
B.

The Models of Lawyering in the Ethics Guidelines

This philosophical disagreement embodied in Nunez and the
majority circuits on the correct allocation of power between lawyers and
clients is vigorously debated by lawyers, legal scholars, and the
judiciary.131 As described above, the Supreme Court has vacillated
between the two models.132 The Court has not endorsed either view and
its jurisprudence indicates praise and criticism for both models of
lawyering.133 Moreover, little guidance is provided in the ethical rules of
conduct promulgated by the bar. The rules are unclear, inconsistent, and
ambiguous,134 mirroring the ambiguity of the Supreme Court regarding
the proper role of lawyers.135 This lack of clarity is also reflected in
treatises analyzing criminal defense ethics.136

130

(2000)).

131

Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477

See Uphoff & Wood, supra note 118, at 4; see, e.g., State v. Robinson, 224 S.E.2d
174, 179 (N.C. 1976) (“Trial counsel, whether court-appointed or privately employed, is not the
mere lackey or ‘mouthpiece’ of his client. He is in charge. . . .”). But see Comm’r Internal Revenue
v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 436 (2005) (“[T]he client retains ultimate dominion and control over the
underlying claim.”).
132
See supra Part II.A; see, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S 745, 751 (1983) (holding that
while a criminal defendant maintains a right to make certain fundamental choices regarding the case,
he does not have a constitutional right to compel counsel to raise every nonfrivolous argument that
he requests); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984) (“The pro se defendant must be
allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense”); id. at 187-88 (“We recognize
that a pro se defendant may wish to dance a solo, not a pas de deux. Standby counsel must generally
respect that preference.”).
133
See supra Part II.
134
Lynn Mather, What Do Clients Want? What Do Lawyers Do?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1065,
1068 (2003).
135
See supra Part II.A.
136
See, e.g., JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS § 5:4 (2d ed. 2007) (“A
criminal defense attorney should . . . respect his or her client’s desires with respect to how the
client’s case should be defended—or whether it should be defended at all . . . . After all, it is the
client’s life, livelihood, and/or liberty which is ultimately at stake in criminal proceedings. On the
other hand, . . . [a]n attorney’s professionalism, sense of justice, and his or her interest in the zealous
representation of a client may lead him or her to believe that a client’s desires . . . are inappropriate,
unlawful, [or] unwise . . . . Must a client’s every wish be accommodated in such circumstances? The
answer is clearly no.”).
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An attempt to apply these ambiguous ethics rules to the question
of whether a lawyer must file an appeal when a defendant has waived this
right in a plea agreement provides few answers.137 Both the Seventh Circuit
and the majority circuits’ approaches can be legitimately defended and
justified upon a study of the different ethical rules of the legal professions.
For example, the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice138 set forth
conflicting propositions for a lawyer’s role regarding an appeal. Standard
4-5.2(a)(v) states that the decision to appeal is among the decisions to be
made by the defendant.139 Similarly, the comment to Standard 4-8.3 reads:
While Counsel has the professional duty to give his or her client fully and
forcefully a candid opinion concerning the case and its probable outcome on
appeal, counsel’s role, however, is only to advise. The decision whether to
appeal must be made by the client.140

However, according to Standard 4-1.2(e), defense counsel is not the
defendant’s “alter ego,” but rather serves as the professional
representative of the accused.141 According to the comment of that
section, the lawyer is not “strictly [the] ‘mouthpiece’ for the client” but
instead maintains an “independent stance as a professional representative
rather than as ordinary agent.”142 Thus, the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice suggest contrary propositions: the decision to appeal must be
made by the defendant but at the same time, the lawyer’s role is to make
professional judgments and not to merely serve as a defendant’s agent.
Likewise, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct143 also
present conflicting ideas as to a lawyer’s role. Some rules explicitly
endorse the lawyer-dominated model, which assumes that clients are not
capable of independently making good decisions. For example, Model
Rule 2.1 encourages a lawyer to apply independent professional
discretion in representing a client.144 In the same vein, comment 1 to
Model Rule 1.3 maintains that a lawyer should exercise professional
judgment in determining the means by which to pursue the case.145 But
137

Despite this ambiguity pervading the legal world’s perception of the lawyer-client
relationship, studies demonstrate that criminal defense attorneys “most often articulated a
professional role of independent advisor rather than agent for their client.” Mather, supra note 134,
at 1073.
138
The ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide guidance to “policymakers and
practitioners working in the criminal justice arena.” See About Criminal Justice Standards,
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/home.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009).
139
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-5.2 (1993).
140
Id. § 4-8.3 cmt. (emphasis added).
141
Id. § 4-1.2(e).
142
Id. § 4-1.2 cmt.
143
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct set out the “professional standards
that serve as models of the regulatory law governing the legal profession.” Preface to MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2008).
144
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2008).
145
Id. R. 1.3 cmt.
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Model Rule 1.2 grants the client the ultimate authority to decide the
goals the lawyer should pursue.146 By conferring the ultimate authority to
the client but allowing for the lawyer to exercise professional judgment,
the Model Rules also hesitate as to the correct allocation of power
between the lawyer and client.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,147 however, is
somewhat clearer. Under section 21(3), “a lawyer may take any lawful
measure within the scope of representation that is reasonably calculated
to advance a client’s objectives.”148 Furthermore, section 22 provides a
list of certain decisions that the client maintains authority to make but
specifically does not include filing an appeal in this list.149 Still, the
Restatement does not unequivocally suggest that the decision to file an
appeal remains within the lawyer’s authority.
The “battle” between the lawyer-dominated model and the
client-controlled one is played out in the legal ethics guidelines, without
a clear winner. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court, the ABA, or the
legal profession as a whole will fully adopt a preferred method of
lawyering, in which the allocation of power between lawyer and client is
clearly set out.150 Thus, in determining whether a lawyer has a
responsibility to file an appeal upon a defendant’s request after a
defendant has waived this right in a plea bargain, it is imperative to look
beyond the models of lawyering presented in Supreme Court precedent
and codes of legal ethics. This issue must therefore be determined
through a policy analysis, examining the potential effects of the circuits’
holdings on judges, lawyers, and defendants.
IV.

A POLICY ANALYSIS: WHY THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
IS PREFERABLE

Excusing a lawyer from filing an appeal upon a defendant’s
request after a defendant has waived this right in a plea agreement will
be beneficial to judges, lawyers, and defendants. Under the Seventh
Circuit’s rule, lawyers are not forced to file futile and therefore frivolous
appeals, thereby promoting both attorney and judicial efficiency.
Furthermore, defendants are protected from the withdrawal of
concessions already granted. Hence, from a public policy perspective, the
Seventh Circuit’s holding is preferable to the majority circuits’ holding.

146

Id. R. 1.2.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers clarifies the common law applicable
to the legal profession. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
(2000).
148
Id. § 21(3).
149
Id. § 22(1).
150
See Mather, supra note 134, at 1084 (“[R]eform will be difficult, even if we agreed on
the direction to take to improve how lawyers act with their clients.”).
147

1204

A.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

Increasing Judicial Efficiency

The majority circuits’ holding encourages frivolous litigation,
thereby minimizing judicial efficiency. As the Seventh Circuit points out,
Nunez’s lawyer had a duty to avoid burdening the judiciary with
frivolous litigation.151 Indeed, filing a futile appeal creates a burden on an
already overloaded appellate system. From 1982 to 2006, the number of
appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals grew by 138%.152 In 2005, the
number of federal appeals reached an all-time high after rising for eleven
consecutive years.153 In addition, the number of criminal appeals in the
U.S. Court of Appeals has surged by 246% since 1980,154 rising 4% over
2008.155 Similarly, state appellate courts face growing caseloads as well,
with appeals doubling about every decade since World War II.156 In some
states, because of overloaded dockets, an appellate case can take more
than four years to finish.157
It is shocking that with such dramatic statistics, the majority
circuits would encourage increasing the number of frivolous appeals.
Any appeal, even an explicitly meritless one, makes use of judicial
resources almost immediately.158 When a party files an appeal, an
appellate court begins to expend resources on the case as soon as it
arrives at the courthouse.159 Upon the case’s arrival, the clerk confirms
that the party has submitted the necessary filing fees and documents.160
At the same time, court staff creates a schedule and collects the appellate
151

Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S.
Ct. 2990 (2008).
152
The number of cases filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals grew from 27,946 in 1982 to
66,618 in 2006. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (2006), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5662006.pdf.
153
Press Release from Karen Redmond, U.S. Courts, Fiscal Year 2006 Caseloads Remain
at High Levels (Mar. 13, 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press_Releases/caseload031307.html.
154
The number of criminal appeals filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals grew from 4405 in
1980 to 15,246 in 2006. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (2006), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5672006.pdf. In his
thirty-two year tenure on the Ninth Circuit, Judge Wallace watched the circuit’s appeals more than
quintuple. See Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Improving the Appellate Process Worldwide Through
Maximizing Judicial Resources, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 187, 189 (2005).
155
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, CHIEF JUSTICE’S YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 11 (2008), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008yearendreport.pdf.
156
Thomas B. Marvell, State Appellate Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72
JUDICATURE 282, 283 (1989).
157
See Commonwealth v. O’Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. 2005) (“[T]here have been
instances where a direct appeal took more than four years to be completed.”); see also State v.
Drakeford, 777 A.2d 202, 210 n.2 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (Landau, J., concurring) (“In the month
that this case was argued, there were more than 300 cases ready for argument and almost 800 other
appeals filed, but not yet ready for oral argument.”); McGruder v. State, 886 So. 2d 27, 35 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2004) (“It is readily apparent that the Court of Appeals is handling an overwhelming amount of
the docket.”).
158
See Wallace, supra note 154, at 192.
159
See id.
160
See id.
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materials (such as briefs) for review.161 The assigned judge then must
review the materials, enforce the schedule, and make sure that litigants
comply with deadlines.162 The appeal filed by a Nunez-like defendant in
the majority circuits may be entirely frivolous, but it still requires
courthouse attention, thereby wasting already limited judicial resources
and reducing judicial efficiency.
Furthermore, the majority circuits overlook the initial historical
reason behind the implementation of appeal waivers in plea bargains.
When the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in 1987, the number of
criminal appeals surged, and as a result, waivers of appeal became
popular among prosecutors.163 In 1995, “the Department of Justice
distributed a memorandum to federal prosecutors” encouraging them to
regularly include appeal waivers in plea bargains.164 The Department of
Justice was concerned that “far too many government resources were
being squandered on meritless appeals by defendants who were merely
unhappy with their sentences but had no good legal claims.”165 Appeal
waivers were also encouraged by judges facing the potential for
backlog.166 The Department of Justice’s encouragement of appeal waivers
was therefore specifically an attempt to prevent criminal appeals backlog
in the federal judiciary.167 Similarly, in the 1990s, some state appellate
courts attempted to decrease backlog by eliminating the right of appeal in
plea-based convictions.168 Thus, by requiring counsel to file an appeal
despite a defendant’s waiver, the majority circuits neutralize the benefits
afforded by appeal waivers and disregard the major purpose for its
implementation and subsequent popularity.169
161

See id.
See id.
163
See King & O’Neill, supra note 4, at 219-20 (“Prior to the Guidelines, once a
defendant entered a guilty plea, there was little to appeal. Because defendants waived most pretrial
and trial rights when pleading guilty, and because sentencing appeals were futile, criminal appeals
were primarily reserved for those few defendants who were convicted after trial. But the new
sentencing statutes and the Guidelines changed that. The Guidelines provided hundreds of new
sentencing issues for defendants to raise on appeal, even after pleading guilty. The hope of avoiding
these sorts of challenges motivated prosecutors to include appeal waivers in plea agreements.”).
164
See Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An Examination of Criminal
Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers 41 (Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 534, 2005),
available at http://works.bepress.com/etienne/1.
165
Id. at 41-42.
166
See King & O’Neill, supra note 4, at 221.
167
See Etienne, supra note 164, at 41-42.
168
See, e.g., State v. Bulger, 614 N.W.2d 103, 106-07 (Mich. 2000) (“By 1992, the Court
of Appeals had a backlog of more than 4,000 cases awaiting decision, and ‘[p]lea-based appeals
constitute[d] approximately thirty percent of all appeals facing the Michigan Court of Appeals.’
Eliminating appeals of right from plea-based convictions was one method proposed to reduce a
crushing burden on our appellate courts.” (quoting Mara Matuszak, Note, Limiting Michigan’s
Guilty and Nolo Contendere Plea Appeals, 73 U. DET. MERCY L.R. 431 (1996)) (citations omitted)).
169
Indeed, the majority of circuits’ holdings create the potential for extensive judicial
proceedings that needlessly drain judicial resources. Specifically, in the majority of circuits, when a
Nunez-like defendant files a writ of habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance for counsel’s
failure to file an appeal, the district court must grant an evidentiary hearing to determine if the
defendant did in fact instruct counsel to file an appeal. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d
162
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The majority of circuits are contributing to judicial
ineffectiveness and slowing down an already bogged-down system by
requiring counsel to file meritless appeals. But by excusing counsel from
filing these frivolous appeals, as the Seventh Circuit suggests, judges will
be free to spend time on the more serious judicial issues with actual,
meritorious arguments. Of course, maximizing judicial efficiency should
not trump a defendant’s fundamental right to due process,170 specifically
the right of access to the courts,171 by denying defendants the opportunity
to appeal. But the defendants in Nunez and the majority circuit cases did
receive due process and access to the courts. The plea bargains (and
waivers of appeal) were supervised and approved by the court, thereby
satisfying their due process right. Furthermore, the defendants were
given the opportunity to make a choice (i.e., whether or not to accept the
plea bargain). While a defendant’s right to due process is fundamental to
our system,172 a defendant does not have the right to pursue a frivolous
appeal.173 Due process does not mean giving a defendant carte blanche to
burden our judicial system by filing an appeal after agreeing not to do so.
B.

Increasing Lawyer Efficiency and Commitment to the Practice of
Criminal Law

In addition to draining judicial resources, requiring lawyers to
file frivolous appeals after a defendant has waived the right to appeal
creates an enormous burden on criminal defense attorney efficiency. In
particular, because 90% of all criminal defendants are assigned public
defenders, this weight falls on the already overworked public defender
attorneys.174 Increasing the workload requirements of public defenders is
highly detrimental to attorney efficiency. Currently, the vast majority of
public defenders’ workloads exceed the ABA’s suggested number of
cases per year, with an annual average caseload of over 1000.175 In fact,
770, 776 (2d Cir. 2006). Either side can then appeal the district court’s decision. See id. If the
defendant succeeds in demonstrating that he or she requested that his or her lawyer file an appeal, a
direct appeal will follow. See id. Under the Seventh Circuit’s rule, however, none of these
proceedings would be necessary. From the start, the defendant would have no claim of ineffective
assistance because counsel was never required to file an appeal. As such, the defendant’s habeas
petition would be dismissed by the district court without any need for even an evidentiary hearing.
170
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (“[T]he right to due process
reflects a fundamental value in our American constitutional system.”).
171
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (“The right of access to the courts . . .
is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to
present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.”).
172
See supra note 170.
173
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988).
174
Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 (1995).
175
See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686-87 & n.40 (2007) (“On
average, public defenders in Baltimore, for example, have been forced to handle as many as 1,163
misdemeanor cases per year, nearly three times the maximum number of cases that the American
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their workload often prevents public defenders from meeting with clients
until the day of trial.176 Because their clients bear no cost for appealing,
public defenders already spend a large part of their time arguing
frivolous appeals (or filing Anders briefs).177 Additionally, public
defenders face the problem of inadequate resources such as
nonfunctioning computers178 and limited support staff.179 Likewise,
private defense attorneys who represent indigent defense cases on a
contract basis face a similar problem of limited time and resources.180
Because they are paid a flat fee for each defendant, they often are forced
to operate “volume practices,” in which they take on more clients than
their resources can sufficiently support.181 Given that these criminal
defense lawyers and public defenders have limited time and resources,
eliminating the requirement to file an appeal once a defendant agrees to
an appeal waiver will enable them to concentrate their efforts and
resources on value-producing work as opposed to futile appeals.
Moreover, requiring lawyers to file these appeals may deter
attorneys from practicing criminal law, and more specifically, from
providing criminal defense counsel to the indigent. With salaries
skyrocketing for young lawyers entering the private sector as compared
to much lower salaries for public defenders,182 the incentive to represent
the criminal indigent is already low. But by requiring the filing of this
frivolous appeal, the best and the brightest of graduating law students
with access to high-paying jobs will be even more disinclined to accept
Bar Association has concluded one attorney can handle effectively . . . . Public defenders in New
York are handling up to 1,600 cases per year.”). According to the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, a lawyer’s caseload per year should not exceed 150 felonies,
400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile, 200 mental health or twenty-five appeals. See ABA Standing
Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System 5
n.19 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciples
booklet.pdf.
176
See Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 8 tbl. 17 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
(indicating that 13.6% of state inmates and 4.9% of federal inmates did not have contact with their
counsel until trial).
177
See Primus, supra note 175, at 682.
178
See id. at 687 (“[T]he funding problems are so severe that attorneys do not have
functioning computers, let alone adequate time and resources to investigate their cases.”).
179
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, KEEPING DEFENDER
WORKLOADS MANAGEABLE 2 (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf (“As
populations and caseloads have increased, many public defender offices have been unable to obtain
corollary increases in staff.”).
180
See Primus, supra note 175, at 688.
181
See id.
182
See Joseph Goldstein, Law Firms Racing to Boast Best Pay for Associates, N.Y. SUN,
Nov. 2, 2007, at Bus. 1, available at http://www.nysun.com/business/law-firms-racing-to-boast-bestpay-for-associates/65738/ (noting that the starting salary for a first year associate at top firms in New
York is around $160,000). Quite the contrary, public defenders make significantly less money. See
Criminal Litigation Careers: Public Defender, VAULT, http://www.vault.com/nr/newsmain.jsp?nr_page=
3&ch_id=242&article_id=22532151&cat_id=2813 (last visited Jan. 4, 2009) (“Salaries in the
$40,000 range are common in big cities . . . . Federal public defenders make . . . as much as a
$70,000 starting salary in New York or as low as $45,000 elsewhere.”).
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jobs as public defenders. Furthermore, those already practicing criminal
defense of the indigent often experience “burnout” and abandon their jobs as
public defenders for less challenging work.183 Requiring a lawyer to file
frivolous appeals will only add to the challenging nature of the work for
these lawyers, increasing burnout and professional frustrations, thereby
discouraging lawyers from continuing their work representing the indigent.
In essence, the majority circuits’ position will effectually serve as disincentive
for lawyers to practice criminal defense law and represent the poor.
Prosecutor efficiency is also minimized when defense lawyers
file these frivolous appeals. In general, since the surge in popularity of
appeal waivers in the 1990s,184 prosecutors have found appeal waivers to
be extremely successful and helpful in reducing their work burden,
minimizing the amount of resources expended and narrowing the issues
raised on appeal.185 However, when a defendant accepts a waiver of
appeal in a plea bargain but then proceeds to file a meritless appeal, the
prosecutor must respond with a brief or memorandum to the court.186
Additionally, since the prosecutor can withdraw concessions when a
defendant violates the terms of a plea agreement by filing an appeal,187 the
time spent by the prosecutor on working out the concessions for the initial
plea bargain becomes a retroactive waste. The prosecutor then needs to
readdress the case, utilizing resources to do so and minimizing efficiency.
In addition, the majority circuits’ holding provides an incentive
to the defendant to lie to the court, potentially damaging a lawyer’s
professional credibility. Specifically, defendants convicted through plea
bargains will have an incentive to fraudulently claim that they instructed
counsel to file an appeal and counsel failed to do so.188 According to the
majority circuits, an automatic claim for ineffective counsel is triggered
if a defendant can prove this.189 Indeed, in the cases from most of the
circuits (except for the Fifth Circuit), the defendants claimed that an
appeal was requested but counsel denied that the defendant had in fact
183

See Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and
Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1205 (2004)
(noting that public defenders quickly find themselves “burned out, worn out, emotionally spent”);
see also Criminal Litigation Careers: Public Defender, supra note 182 (“The public defender might
be the unsung hero of the legal system. As a government employee, he makes relatively little for a
litigator. He has little say over his cases and often works with the defendants that no one else wants.
He doesn’t have the resources that the district attorney’s office has and must often engage in his own
investigations. Many of his cases seem almost hopeless and, to the victims of crime, he appears
almost as bad as his defendants.”).
184
See supra Part IV.A.
185
King & O’Neill, supra note 4, at 230.
186
See id. at 220, 231.
187
See, e.g., United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
when a defendant violates a plea agreement by appealing despite a promise not to do so, the
prosecutor may withdraw concessions made as part of the bargain); United States v. Cimino, 381
F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (same).
188
See United States v. Farr, 297 F.3d 651, 657 (“We have observed in the past that
criminal defendants frequently ‘demonize’ their lawyers.”).
189
See supra Introduction.
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requested it.190 Requiring a lawyer to defend his or herself from these
types of wrongful accusations could potentially prove detrimental to his
or her professional reputation.191 Moreover, counsel may not have readily
accessible evidence to demonstrate that the defendant never requested an
appeal, and as a result, it could appear as if he or she provided ineffective
counsel. Finally, a lawyer would have to attend an evidentiary hearing to
prove that a request for an appeal was never made, using time and
resources to do so, again minimizing attorney efficiency.
C.

Protecting Defendants

Finally, while the majority circuits claim to be concerned about
affording defendants their Sixth Amendment rights, it is the Seventh
Circuit’s approach that sufficiently provides protection to defendants.
When a defendant files an appeal after agreeing to a waiver of appeal in a
plea bargain, the plea bargain becomes worthless to the government. The
concessions originally offered no longer provide any benefit to the
government since the prosecutor will now have to expend resources
responding to the defendant’s appeal.192 As such, once a defendant’s
counsel files an appeal notwithstanding the waiver, the prosecutor has
the option to withdraw concessions already granted in response to the
defendant’s breach of the agreement.193 Given the fact that the appeal
cannot succeed (since the defendant has already accepted the plea),194
counsel’s filing of the appeal only serves to harm the defendant by
potentially resulting in the prosecutor taking the concessions off of the

190

See Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 267 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770,
772 (2d. Cir. 2006); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262,
1264 (10th Cir. 2005); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
191
Courts have expressed concern over legal proceedings that negatively affect a lawyer’s
career. See United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that after a district
court sanctions a lawyer for an ethical violation, the lawyer can appeal the decision because the
sanction may be detrimental to lawyer’s career). Additionally, courts stress the importance of
maintaining a lawyer’s professional reputation. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
413 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[M]ost lawyers are wise enough
to know that their most precious asset is their professional reputation.”); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (noting that reputational interests “are deemed to be more substantial than mere
loss of money”); United States v. Gonzales, 344 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2003) (“An attorney’s
professional reputation undoubtedly is his or her most valuable asset.”).
192
United States v. Whitlow, 287 F.3d 638, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hare,
269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An appeal requires the prosecutor’s office to spend time
researching the record, writing a brief, and attending oral argument. All of this time could be
devoted to other prosecutions; and a promise that frees up time may induce a prosecutor to offer
concessions.”).
193
See supra note 82.
194
When a defendant appeals despite an appeal waiver, the government may file a motion
to dismiss the appeal based upon the waiver. See United States v. Buchanan, 131 F.3d 1005, 1008
(11th Cir. 1997). An appellate court will dismiss the appeal as meritless since the defendant waived
the right to appeal. See Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d at 1197.
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table.195 Also, if prosecutors believe that appeals will be filed despite
defendants’ promise not to do so, prosecutors will be more reluctant to make
concessions to defendants.196 Prosecutors, Judge Easterbook of the Seventh
Circuit notes, “cannot be fooled in the long run”197 and “[d]efendants must
take the bitter [waiver of appeal] with the sweet [concessions].”198
Despite the potential detrimental effect of an appeal on the
defendant, the majority circuits hold that this decision should lie in the
hands of the defendant and that protecting defendants should mean
providing them with the right to make such decisions.199 Under that
rationale, as long as counsel informs the defendant that the appeal could
be harmful and risky, the defendant should make the final decision.
However, there are many instances in which the legal system protects
clients by removing their right to decide. For example, in an effort to
protect a client from a wily lawyer, a lawyer cannot contact the opposing
client without permission from the opposing client’s lawyer.200 A client
cannot agree to waive this rule and instead, the right to waive it belongs
to the client’s lawyer.201 A client also cannot agree to pay an
unreasonable attorney’s fee.202 These rules remove choice from clients in
an effort to promote their best interests. Similarly, by removing the
decision to appeal from defendants, the Seventh Circuit is protecting
them from making poor decisions that will likely harm them.
As discussed above, given that public defenders and courtappointed attorneys have limited resources, eliminating a lawyer’s duty
to file an appeal after a defendant has waived the right to appeal will
enable criminal defense attorneys to concentrate their time, money, and
resources defending criminals awaiting trial, which will improve the
overall quality of defendants’ representation.203 While the Seventh
Circuit’s approach does not provide an avenue for the defendant to
fruitlessly pursue frivolous claims, it does protect the benefits a

195

Nunez v. United States (Nunez I), 495 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S.
Ct. 2990 (2008); see, e.g., Hare, 269 F.3d at 860; United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir.
2000) ( “[A] defendant who breaches a plea agreement forfeits any right to its enforcement.”); see
also supra Part II.B.
196
United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (1995) (“Empty promises are worthless
promises; if defendants could retract their waivers . . . then they could not obtain concessions by
promising not to appeal. Although any given defendant would like to obtain the concession and
exercise the right as well, prosecutors cannot be fooled in the long run.”).
197
Id.
198
Id. at 283 (“[Defendant] wants the benefits of the existing agreement but not the
principal detriment. That is the one outcome that would be most destructive of the plea agreement
process. Defendants must take the bitter with the sweet. It is all or nothing, and [defendant] most
assuredly does not want to start over and face the prospect of a trial.”).
199
See supra Part III.A.
200
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2008). This rule is commonly referred to
as the “No Contact” rule.
201
Id.
202
Id. at R. 1.5(a).
203
See supra Part IV.B.
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defendant has already received. It also takes into account the general
well-being of criminal defendants throughout the system.
CONCLUSION
This circuit split between the Seventh Circuit and the majority
circuits looms over the criminal justice system and has the potential to
wreak havoc and uncertainty among criminal defense lawyers and
defendants.204 This dangerous ambiguity is not limited to courts that fall
within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.205 In fact, in July 2008, the
Third Circuit sided with the Seventh Circuit and dismissed the majority
circuits’ approach.206 Thus, given the wide sweeping effect of this circuit
split in criminal cases, it would behoove the Supreme Court to clarify its
jurisprudence by holding that that a plea bargain in which a defendant
waives the right to appeal relieves counsel of a duty to file an appeal.207
Nonetheless, there is a different approach for attorneys and
judges to consider if the approach of the majority circuits prevails. A
defendant can waive constitutional rights in exchange for concessions,
including the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.208
Defense attorneys and prosecutors could hypothetically contract around
204

Indeed, district courts within the Seventh Circuit have already begun citing to Nunez to
support the proposition that a defendant who has waived the right to appeal via plea bargain is not
entitled to a new appeal when counsel fails to file the appeal upon the defendant’s request. See, e.g.,
Salas v. United States, No. IP 05-111-H/F-CR-01, 2007 WL 3286611, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2007)
(holding that a defendant does not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel fails to file
an appeal after the defendant has waived the right to appeal in a plea bargain); Hermann v. United
States, No. 05-3277, 2007 WL 2700161, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2007) (same).
205
See, e.g., United States v. McCormick, No. 01-80306, 2008 WL 5110574, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Dec. 2, 2008) (“[D]efendant cannot show that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
direct appeal, because defendant waived his right to appeal . . . .”); United States v. Walls, No. 0592, 2008 WL 927926, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 4, 2008) (“[T]he defendant’s valid waiver of his right to
appeal dooms his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . . .”).
206
In United States v. Mabry, the Third Circuit stated:
The analysis employed in evaluating an ineffectiveness of counsel claim does not apply
when there is an appellate waiver. While a defendant may be entitled to habeas relief if
his attorney ineffectively fails to file a requested appeal because it is presumed to be
prejudicial under Flores-Ortega, if that same defendant has effectively waived his right
to habeas, he cannot even bring such a claim unless the waiver fails to pass muster
under an entirely different test: one that examines its knowing and voluntary nature and
asks whether its enforcement would work a miscarriage of justice . . . . We, therefore,
will part ways with the approach taken by the majority of courts of appeals. Although
vacated on other grounds, the Nunez opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit presents the proper focus.
United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 241-42 (3d Cir. 2008).
207
This would not require the Supreme Court to overturn any precedents. As described
above, the Seventh Circuit’s holding can be reconciled with previous Supreme Court jurisprudence
in this area. See supra Part II.B. Rather, such a holding would serve as a clarification to previous
Court cases (such as Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.
470 (2000)) by further defining when a lawyer has a responsibility to file an appeal.
208
See United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 860 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Jason Mazzone,
The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801 (2003).
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the requirement for counsel to file an appeal by explicitly including a
waiver of the right to counsel as part of an appeal waiver plea agreement.
By doing so, counsel would be exempt from filing the appeal not because
the defendant waived the right to appeal but rather because the defendant
waived the right to counsel. Assuming that the plea bargain was valid,209
this process would bypass those defendants requesting an appeal
following the acceptance of the plea bargain. Like the Seventh Circuit
approach, this method would maximize judicial and attorney efficiency
by preventing frivolous appeals. Defendants would also benefit from this
approach. In particular, they would not be able to breach the plea
agreement by filing an appeal, thereby preventing prosecutors from
withdrawing the concessions offered in the plea bargain.210
Nonetheless, a defendant might be more hesitant to waive the
right to counsel than to waive the right to appeal. Additionally, there is
something discomforting about regularly encouraging and compelling a
defendant to waive the constitutional guarantee of counsel, something
that seems inherently and philosophically in conflict with the Sixth
Amendment. As such, the Seventh Circuit’s holding is preferable and
should be adopted by the Supreme Court.211 By dispensing with a
lawyer’s requirement to file an appeal upon a defendant’s request after
he or she has waived the right in a plea bargain, the Seventh Circuit
created a policy that benefits all participants in the criminal justice
system while abiding by both Supreme Court precedent and models of
legal professional responsibility.
Tamar Kaplan-Marans†

209

To be valid, the plea bargain must be “voluntary” and “intelligent.” Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). If the plea
bargain was not valid, neither the waiver of appeal nor the waiver of counsel would be effective. See
supra note 35.
210
Of course, if the defendant claimed the waiver was involuntary, then counsel would
still need to file an appeal on the basis that waiver was invalid despite the defendant’s waiver of the
right to counsel. See supra note 42.
211
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Nunez was represented by the prominent and large
firm Winston and Strawn, which has an active appellate and Supreme Court practice. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at *1; see also WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, http://www.winston.com/
index.cfm?contentID=19&itemID=156&itemType=20&pageID=320 (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). It
therefore seems likely that Nunez will petition again for certiorari. Additionally, given the import of
the circuit split and the fact that the Court previously granted certiorari in this case, it is also likely
that the Court will agree to hear it again.
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